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Abstract
Taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, the impact of in-
termarriage on labor market productivity as measured by earnings is ex-
amined. Contrarily to previous studies which rely on instrumental variable
techniques, selection issues are addressed within a ﬁxed eﬀects framework.
The model accounts for short and long term eﬀects as well as general dif-
ferences between those who intermarry and those who do not. Once unob-
served heterogeneity is incorporated, advantageous eﬀects from intermar-
riage vanish and do not diﬀer from premiums from marriage between im-
migrants. However, immigrants who eventually intermarry receive greater
returns to experience indicating better labor market integration.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: J1, J12
Keywords: intermarriage, integration, labor market, migration
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Market Success in the DFG-Priority Program Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labor Markets (Flexi-
bilisierungspotenziale bei heterogenen Arbeitsm¨ arkten).1 Introduction
Suppose love creates the closest relationship possible between two people and
ideally drives the decision to marry. Further assuming that each person is intrin-
sically tied to his or her family and marked by his or her ethnic origin, marriage
between people with diﬀerent ethnic backgrounds expresses the closest feasible
connection to the culture of the spouse. Marriages and marriage-like partnerships
between immigrants and natives, termed ‘intermarriage’, are thus commonly con-
sidered to be an indicator of a high level of social integration, an index of assimi-
lation, an indicator of social distance and cultural proximity, as well as an intimate
link between social groups (Prince and Zubrzycki (1962), Gurak and Fitzpatrick
(1982), Klein (2001), Kalmijn (1998), and Muttarak (2004)).
For this reason, studies analyzing marriages between persons of diﬀerent eth-
nicity or race have a long history, especially in traditional immigrant nations like
the United States. Against the backdrop of the current political debate concerning
the successful integration of immigrants and Germany’s status as an immigration
country, it is important to examine in greater depth the connections between in-
termarriage and economic status of immigrants in Germany. Thus the aim of this
paper is to analyze the eﬀect of intermarriage on economic success for immigrants
in Germany.
When studying the relation between intermarriage and labor market outcomes,
two competing hypotheses are relevant: (a) the productivity hypothesis, and (b)
the selection hypothesis. According to the productivity hypothesis, intermarriage
fosters economic integration as native spouses boost linguistic adjustment, pro-
vide knowledge of the local labor market, access to social networks, and insight
2into important structures. In addition, they explain local customs, norms, and
peculiarities. Daily practice with the spouse enables intermarried immigrants to
better communicate with native colleagues and to become better integrated into
the working environment. Furthermore, intermarriage signals greater adaptability
to the host country’s society and a high level of familiarity with its foreign culture.
However, if intermarriage basically reﬂects commitment and the decision to
stay immigrants who intermarry may experience economic success resulting only
from their greater attachment. Those who intermarry may be more eager to ac-
quire precious skills that are highly valued in the labor market, and meeting a
native partner is merely a side product of this process. In addition, economic out-
comes could be aﬀected by other unobservable productivity characteristics cor-
relating with intermarriage. Thus, according to the selection hypothesis, the re-
lationship between intermarriage and economic success is spurious, and eﬀects
from intermarriage are biased if the self-selection into intermarriage based on in-
dividual factors is ignored. Consequently, intermarriage needs to be viewed as
treatment that is possibly endogenously related to economic outcomes.
The empirical analysis beneﬁts from using German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) data. Panel data is more appropriate than cross-section data for this type
of study because it allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Its longitudi-
nal design provides a diﬀerent estimation method from previous studies, which
are predominately based on cross-sectional observations and rely on instrumen-
tal variables to control for self-selection. Instead, in this paper, a ﬁxed eﬀects
regression framework is used to resolve the omitted variable problem. In addi-
tion, the empirical speciﬁcation allows for the diﬀerent timing of possible eﬀects
of intermarriage and accounts for general marital pay diﬀerentials. The empiri-
3cal analysis considers both men and women, while brieﬂy examining the possible
eﬀects of intermarriage for natives.
Empirical ﬁndings indicate that male immigrants’ immediate beneﬁts from
intermarriage are mainly driven by unobserved time-constant factors and vanish
once selection into marriage is taken into account. In this regard, eﬀects do not
diﬀer statistically between intermarriage and marriage between two immigrants.
However, those who eventually live with natives receive greater returns to labor
market experience indicating generally enhanced productivity. Thus, intermar-
riage seems to signal greater economic integration. Native men do not receive
any extra beneﬁt from either marriage type, while native women seem to gain an
advantage from marrying an immigrant. Immigrant women, on the other hand,
do not beneﬁt from either type of marriage, although negative eﬀects are miti-
gated when controlling for unobserved factors and other observable characteris-
tics. However, results for women must be treated carefully as selection issues
related to their labor market participation are mainly set aside.
Within the upcoming chapter a short overview of German-speciﬁc facts and
theoretical concepts related to intermarriage are presented. This includes a litera-
turereviewofstudiesthatanalyzethedeterminantsofintermarriageanditsimpact
on economic assimilation in other countries. The empirical model is introduced in
Section 3. Due to Germany’s immigration history, deﬁnition issues are discussed
separately in Section 4. Descriptive statistics of the underlying sample are given
in Section 5. In Section 6 estimation results and its interpretation are presented.
The paper ﬁnally concludes with a summary and an outlook for further research.
42 Background
Only in the years after 2000 did Germany acknowledge its status as an immi-
gration nation. At the same time there is greater government attention to inte-
grating immigrants. German-language requirements, accepting Germany’s demo-
cratic norms, and accepting the rule of law are mandatory for those wanting to
naturalize. But beyond language ﬂuency and other indicators such as educational
success and employment status, marriage to natives is generally considered a test
of integration.1
In contrast to traditional immigrant countries like the United States, research
on intermarriage in Germany began comparably late. However there is much in-
terest in understanding marriage patterns among immigrants in Germany. A sig-
niﬁcant part of the literature examines the social and economic factors fostering
interethnic partnerships. Thus, most studies focus on describing marriage pat-
terns and its determinants leaving aside economic implications (Kane and Stephan
(1988); Klein (2001); Haug (2006); Schroedter (2006)).
According to that strand of literature, structural constraints in the marriage
market such as gender ratios and partner availability (Angrist (2002)), as well as
interference by third parties, religious beliefs, socio-economic status, as well as
cultural and linguistic proximity are the principle inﬂuences on the likelihood to
intermarry. In addition, in certain cases intermarriage is related to the acquisition
of citizenship and permanent residency, depending on legal status and country of
origin. In this regard, intermarriage may be one possible way to legally immigrate
1The Ethnosizer is another measures of social integration, see Zimmermann, Zimmermann,
and Constant (2007); Zimmermann (2007); Constant and Zimmermann (2008); Constant, Gataul-
lina, and Zimmermann (2009).
5to a foreign country. On the other hand, ‘importing’ spouses from their country
of origin is sometimes the only legal route for admittance to the host country
(Gonz` ales-Ferrer (2006); Lievens (1999)). Thus, the likelihood of intermarriage
is expected to diﬀer by country of origin.
In addition, personal characteristics such as individual preferences, age, years
since immigration, language abilities, and education are among the most rele-
vant determinants of intermarriage (Lievens (1998); Chiswick and Houseworth
(2008); Kalmijn (1998); Kalmijn (1991); Bisin and Verdier (2000); Bisin, Topa
and Verdier (2004)).
As stated by Becker (1974), individuals generally prefer spouses with similar
bundles of resources. Thereby the partner does not have to have the exact same
level in each characteristic, but needs to compensate for shortages in one area
by oﬀering richness upon another. In particular, people usually prefer partners
with similar education levels, which is called assortative mating by education
(Chiswick and Houseworth (2008)). Moreover, highly educated immigrants are
expected to intermarry more often as discussed by Furtado (2006) and Furtado
and Theodoropoulos (2010). Accordingly, and apart from the fact that educa-
tional institutions provide platforms to meet potential partners, higher education
accompanied by better communication skills enable immigrants to approach oth-
ers, including natives, and help improve adaptation to diﬀerent cultural habits
(adaptability eﬀect). Furthermore, highly educated immigrants are more likely to
move away from ethnic enclaves and to live in neighborhoods with predominately
native inhabitants. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of intermarriage (enclave
eﬀect).2 Consequently, intermarried immigrants are likely to be a highly selective,
2In addition, German law favors immigration of highly educated people who seek to immigrate
6well educated subgroup of the total immigrant population.
This illustrates how important selection issues are when analyzing the rela-
tionship between intermarriage and labor market outcomes. Consequently, two
competing hypotheses are crucial in this context: (a) the productivity hypothesis,
and (b) the selection hypothesis. According to the ﬁrst, immigrants who inter-
marry assimilate faster to the host society due to greater productivity fostered by
the native spouse. In that regard, intermarriage can be beneﬁcial for several rea-
sons. Marriage to a native person can foster language acquisition, provide access
to social networks, open up valuable contacts and occupation opportunities, ease
the process of adapting to a foreign country, help to understand unfamiliar cus-
toms and norms, as well as help to learn the unique host-country peculiarities and
requirements. Consequently, intermarriage can increase the feeling of belonging
and lead to greater acceptance. Intermarriage can thus contribute positively to the
well-being of immigrants who, as a result, become more productive.
Contrarily, according to the selection hypothesis, the relationship between in-
termarriage and higher assimilation rates of immigrants is spurious due to sample
selection. Immigrants who marry native spouses possibly belong to a highly se-
lective sample of immigrants who possess highly valued labor market skills that
are also highly valued in the native marriage market (Kantarevic (2004)). Conse-
quently, the eﬀect of intermarriage on wages is biased if selection into marriage is
not taken into account.3
based on marriage to a German national. Immigrants coming from EU-member states and other
well developed countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland,
Japan, South Korea or Israel, face fewer hurdles for marriage-based immigration than immigrants
from less developed countries.
3These arguments are mainly derived from research on the male marriage premium as dis-
cussed by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987); Korenman and Neumark (1991); Loh (1996); Her-
sch and Stratton (2000); Ginther and Zavodny (2001); Antonovics and Town (2004); Dougherty
7Beyond that, intermarriage can induce costs, especially psychological ones,
which can even have the opposite eﬀect. As shown by Bratter and Eschbach
(2006), intermarriage is associated with an increase in severe distress for some
immigrantgroupsintheUnitedStates. Immigrantsmarringspousesfromdiﬀerent
ethnic groups may no longer be supported by members of their own ethnic group.
They face a lack of understanding and feel detached from their ethnic group, and,
as a consequence, rely neither on family ties nor social networks from their ethnic
community to ﬁnd a job. This, in turn, decreases the possibility of ﬁnding a job
that matches immigrant’s capabilities.4 In addition, immigrants in intermarriage
may face intolerance from the native partner’s side. Relatives and friends may fail
to tolerate and accept unfamiliar ways of living and unaccustomed perspectives.
Consequently, intermarried couples face many diﬃculties from both the ethnic
group of the immigrant partner and the native society.
Finally, diﬀerent perceptions and norms challenge the couple, thus inducing
a high potential for conﬂicts within the marriage.5 Kalmijn, Graaf and Janssen
(2005)ﬁndapositivecorrelationbetweenintermarriageanddivorce, thussupport-
ing the assumption that intermarriage faces greater stress than ‘intra-immigrant
marriages’, that is marriage between two immigrants. Hence, even though inter-
marriage is associated with many beneﬁts it can also be costly.
Analyzing the economic assimilation of intermarried immigrants in the United
States, Kantarevic (2004) ﬁnds evidence for an intermarriage premium in terms of
higher earnings if selection into marriage is ignored. Once selection is taken into
(2006); Cornwell and Rupert (2007); Chen (2007).
4As argued by Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009a), intra-immigrant marriage fosters better
employment matches in terms of qualiﬁcation than intermarriage.
5See St¨ ocker-Zafari (2007) for real life experiences of intermarried couples.
8account, the premium from marrying a native partner vanishes. In contrast, Meng
and Gregory (2005) analyzing the impact of intermarriage for immigrants in Aus-
tralia, ﬁnd evidence for a premium from intermarriage even after controlling for
unobservable characteristics. These ﬁndings are supported by Meng and Meurs
(2006)intheirstudyofintermarriedimmigrantsinFrance. Otherstudies, focusing
on immigrants in Sweden (Dribe and Lundh (2008)) and the Netherlands (Gevrek
(2009)), ﬁnd positive eﬀects on wages for Swedish immigrants and positive cor-
relations between intermarriage and economic outcomes for Dutch immigrants.
Furtado and Theodorpopoulos (2009a) and (2009b), as well as Georgarakos and
Tatsiramos (2009) focus on labor market outcomes such as employment probabil-
ities, network eﬀects, and self-employment, and ﬁnd positive eﬀects from inter-
marriage for immigrant men in the United States. However, little is known about
the relationship between intermarriage and economic performance of immigrants
in Germany. Thus, this paper aims at ﬁlling this gap in the literature.
3 The Model
Most studies exploring the relation between intermarriage and earnings are based
on instrumental variable approaches in cross sectional settings. The authors ac-
count for endogeneity of intermarriage by using speciﬁc ethnic group and gender
ratios that measure the availability of partners within ethnic groups. The underly-
ing assumption is that these ratios determine partner choice but are exogenous in
the earnings equation.
In contrast, the model used here relies on a ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) approach to
account for unobserved heterogeneity. The earnings equation is derived from a
9Mincer (1974) wage equation and allows for individual speciﬁc factors in the error
term. It follows a model proposed by Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) who
measure the eﬀect of naturalization on wage growth. The advantage of this model
is that it allows for diﬀerent timings for the eﬀects on wages while mitigating
selection biases induced by time-constant individual characteristics.
The model accounts for both short and long term eﬀects on earnings, whereby
long term eﬀects are measured via experience acquired in the course of marriage.
Short term eﬀects are captured by the immediate change in marital status. Further-
more, immigrants who eventually intermarry may principally invest diﬀerently in
their human capital. Being intermarried then proxies better economic integration
in general, and those who marry natives beneﬁt more from experience acquired
in the local labor market than those immigrants who remain single or marry other
immigrants.
The earnings equation looks as follows6:
lnwit = α0Migit + β0Natit + α1Migit(Xit − XiMig) + β1Natit(Xit − XiNat)
+α2 ¯ MigiXit + β2 ¯ NatiXit + ζ1Xit + ζ2X
2
it + ζ3Zit + µi + uit.
Thereby, the dependent variable, wit, denotes monthly labor gross earnings of
immigrant i in period t, and is used as the productivity measure for individual i.
Natit is an indicator variable which equals one if in period t person i is married
to a native and zero else. The immediate eﬀect of intermarriage for immigrants
is then captured by β0. A supplementary regressor, Migit, denotes marriage with
another immigrant. Consequently, Migit and Natit capture eﬀects from each type
6As an extension, square terms Natit(Xit−XiNat)2 and Migit(Xit−XiMig)2 are included to account
for decreasing returns to experience.
10of marriage in comparison to those who are unmarried at this point in time. 7
Apartfromshortterm eﬀects, marriagemayaﬀectlabormarketsuccess gradu-
ally. For that reason, Korneman and Neumark (1991) include duration of marriage
as an additional regressor. Here, a diﬀerent measure is used: Xit and XiNat (XiMig)
refer to labor market experience in period t and at the point of intermarriage (mar-
riage with an immigrant). For immigrants the diﬀerence between Xit and XiNat
therefore captures experience gained during intermarriage. Equivalently, the dif-
ference between Xit and XiMig captures experience gained in the course of marriage
with an immigrant.
In case α1 and β1 are greater than zero, immigrants beneﬁt from additional
labor market experience acquired during the marriage compared to those who re-
main single. This might be due to favorable specialization within the marriage.
Negative coeﬃcients could result from less ﬂexibility and less mobility in compar-
ison to singles, or stem from a lack of possibilities to search for jobs that optimally
match one’s abilities. Diﬀerent signs of α1 and β1 could indicate diﬀerent search
patterns, gender roles, or human capital allocations within the marriage.
Apart from short and long term eﬀects, the decision to eventually intermarry
may reﬂect greater commitment to the hosting country in general. Immigrants
who ﬁnd a native partner may be more attached to the hosting country than those
who never intermarry. They may have invested in human capital speciﬁc to the
local labor market and developed precious skills that are highly valued possibly
independent of the current marital status. As a consequence, those who eventually
intermarry may obtain greater returns to their labor market experience than others.
7Regarding natives, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients goes exactly the opposite direction: In
this case, Natit refers to marriage with a native and Migit refers to intermarriage.
11To account for that, ¯ Nati is included as a time-invariant indicator for immi-
grants who eventually marry a native spouse. The variable is set to one in the years
prior, during and after an intermarriage, assuming that abilities can be gained be-
forehand and need not become redundant with the end of marriage. Because rela-
tionships change with time, ¯ Nat refers to those who may have several but always
native partners. Thus, if β2 > 0 greater returns to experience are permitted for
immigrants who eventually live with native spouses. Immigrants who exclusively
marry within the immigrant community are denoted by ¯ Migi.8 Consequently, per-
sons who remain single the whole time are the base category.9
Parameters ζ1, ζ2 and ζ3 refer to returns to experience, Xit, its square term,
X2
it, and to returns to other observable characteristics captured in Zit. Experience
in this context refers to experience in full-time employment acquired in the host
country. Zit includes education indicators, self-reported language proﬁciency, ﬁrm
size, actual hours worked, tenure and its square term, full-time work, as well as
region and industry dummies. Even though years since migration seem to be an
important determinant of the probability to intermarry, as argued among others by
Chiswick and Housworth (2008), it is not included in Zit as it evolves similar to
experience. Hence, it is not possible to separate the eﬀects of experience and years
elapsed in the country.10 Furthermore, marriage could result from an increase in
8These variables are diﬃcult to construct because they include all past and future decisions
which are typically not observed in the data. Ideally, we would like to compare people for whom
we have information about the whole life time and not just occasional short observation periods.
However, this information is not available. So we can only consider the observation period and
distinguish between those who report a native partner within this time frame and those who report
no or an immigrant partner.
9Those who have both immigrant and native partners are not considered to reduce complexity.
10Both variables generally move together, increasing by one each year. Although, they might
not always be perfectly collinear, any diﬀerences are probably due to endogenous labor supply
decisions. As the model concentrates on returns to experience, years spent in the country are not
included in the regression.
12earnings in previous periods. To account for this correlation and possible reverse
causality, dummy variables denoting marriage with a native or with an immigrant
in the next period are included.
Finally, intermarried immigrants may possess diﬀerent unobservable produc-
tivity characteristics which correlate with the decision to intermarry. The compos-
ite error term therefore consists of a time-invariant individual heterogeneity term,
µi, and an idiosyncratic part, uit.
4 Deﬁnitions
Before turning to the data description, some remarks are necessary to understand
possible diﬃculties related to the deﬁnition of immigrants in Germany.
German law deﬁnes Germans as persons holding German citizenship. In Ger-
many, Ausl¨ ander (foreigners) are those holding citizenship from a foreign country
only. As Germany does not grant citizenship to those born on German soil, chil-
dren of foreign parents usually hold the same citizenship as their parents. If one
parent is a German citizen, a child can gain dual citizenship. Persons with dual
(German and foreign) citizenship count as Germans by the German Statistical
Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland).11 Although Germany loosened its
very strict naturalization law for children of ﬁrst-generation foreigners, there are
members of the second and third generations who have not naturalized. In na-
tionality statistics, they are counted as foreigner regardless of how long they have
lived in Germany.
11Between ages 18 and 23, children with dual citizenship must choose one citizenship, as man-
dated by a law passed in 2000 commonly known as the option model. People with dual nationality
are not counted as foreigners in oﬃcial statistics that use nationality as the single criteria.
13Deﬁning immigrant status by nationality is technically easy. Following this
deﬁnition, intermarriage refers to marriage between a German citizen and some-
one who does not hold German citizenship, regardless of where that person was
born. For example, an intermarriage by nationality could involve a German-
citizen woman and the Turkish-nationality, German-born son of a Turkish guest
worker.12 It would also include, misleadingly, marriages between naturalized cit-
izens and non-citizens who are both of Turkish background, for example.
Furthermore, nationality and, by that, intermarriage status can change over
time if the non-citizen spouse naturalizes. Therefore, nationality does not suf-
ﬁciently capture cultural diversity in the family. In contrast, country of birth
remains unchanged also after naturalization. Combining information about na-
tionality and country of birth therefore better reﬂects cultural inﬂuences in child-
hood and throughout adult life. Including parental nationality and country of birth
incorporates familial immigration and allows the distinction between immigrant
generations.13
Accordingly, ﬁrst generation immigrants are deﬁned as persons who are not
born in Germany. Those who are born in Germany but are non-German citizens,
or whose mother/father is not German born or has non-German nationality are
called second generation immigrants.14
12The term guest worker refers to foreigners who came to Germany in the course of the guest
worker recruitment beginning in the 1950s. Until the mid70s Germany signed treaties with sev-
eral Souther European countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia) to recruit
predominatelylow skilledlaborersto workin lowqualiﬁedsectors. For moredetailedand compre-
hensive information on Germany’s immigration history see, for instant, Kalter and Granto (2007)
13In cases where there is no information available about country of birth for the immigrant and
his/her parents, nationality is taken as a single criteria to determine immigrant status.
14In case both parents are not born in Germany but also not born in the same country, the country
of origin of the mother is assumed to outweigh the country of origin of the father. According to
this ‘classical’ role allocation within the family, the mother raises the children while the father
works to earn the money. Consequently, the inﬂuence, including cultural aspects, of the mother
14Another peculiarity in Germany are the Aussiedler. Those are people of Ger-
man descent who moved to Germany, predominantly from Eastern Europe, and
were granted German citizenship upon arrival by virtue of their ethnicity and fam-
ily history. Between 1950 and 2005, Aussiedler came mainly from Poland, Hun-
gary, Romania, and states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Yugoslavia. They are counted as Germans in oﬃcial statistics that
use nationality as the single criteria for immigrant status. However, the deﬁni-
tion of immigrant status in this paper deﬁnes Aussiedler as belonging to the group
of immigrants since emphasis is put on cultural diﬀerences and German-speciﬁc
knowledge of partners. Consequently, Aussiedler are treated as part of the immi-
grant population and do not take on an exceptional role even though their language
abilitiesareoftenmoreadvancedandtheymayfeelmoreattachedtoGermanydue
to their German ancestry.15
Consequently, Natives are persons born in Germany, holding German citizen-
ship, and whose parents are both German-born with German citizenship. Inter-
marriage is deﬁned as marriage and marriage-like partnership between an immi-
grant and a native person. All other relationship types, where both individuals
on the child is assumed to be greater than the inﬂuence of the father. Therefore, it is assumed that
cultural knowledge is transferred from the mother to the child rather than from the father. This
argumentation is in line with cross-cultural psychology literature as represented by Phinney et al.
(2001) and Warikoo (2005). However, the number of cases is negligible in the data underlying this
study.
15Starting in 2005, the German Statistical Oﬃce uses new rules to deﬁne immigrants and their
children: ‘migration background’. The foreign born have a migration background, within which is
their ‘own migration experience’. Their children and grandchildren have a migration background
but are called ‘persons without own migration experience’. A child with a native parent and a
foreign-born parent, therefore, has a migration background but without their own migration expe-
rience. According to the 2005 deﬁnition, Aussiedler are included in the ‘migration background’
category and in the subcategory of ‘own migration experience’. Thus the deﬁnition of immigrants
and classiﬁcation of Aussiedler used in this paper principally resembles that of ‘migration back-
ground’ in Germany’s micro census.
15are immigrants, are considered Intra-immigrant Marriage. This makes a marriage
between a Turkish man and a Polish woman an intra-immigrant marriage even
though both have diﬀerent ethnic backgrounds. This deﬁnition emphasizes that
the beneﬁts of intermarriage, if present, result from the German-speciﬁc knowl-
edge of one spouse. Marriage in this context does not refer to legal marital status
but to a partner of the opposite sex living in the same household. Hence, marriage
is put on level of partnership and cohabitation respectively. However, the majority




The SOEP is a representative longitudinal survey started in 1984.16 The 2007 sur-
vey includes information for about 20,000 individuals and 11,000 private house-
holds. This data source provides information for a variety of social and economic
issues. Due to its panel design and an over sampling of immigrants, it opens
excellent possibilities for empirical research and is especially suited to analyze
intermarriage behavior at the individual level.17
The analysis focuses on potential earning eﬀects for the working population,
hence persons aged 20 to 65 who are currently not unemployed and not enrolled in
school. Arguments related to the productivity hypothesis are more convincing for
immigrants who are not born in Germany. Thus, the focus lies on ﬁrst generation
16For more detailed information about the SOEP see Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007).
17SOEP sample weights for foreigners relies upon a diﬀerent deﬁnition of immigrant status.
Thus, SOEP weighting factors are not used in this analysis.
16immigrants.18
The underlying unbalanced sample consists of 3,522 ﬁrst generation men and
3,341 ﬁrst generation women.19 The majority of male immigrants (79.4 percent)
report a partner at least once during the oberserved time. For immigrant women
the number is quite similar: 82.5 percent report a partner at least once. This leaves
20.6 and 17.5 percent, respectively, single throughout the study duration. Those
who report a partner predominately live with immigrant partners (65.6 percent of
men and 68.2 percent of women). Among immigrant men only 13.9 percent ever
live with a native women, and only 14.3 percent of the immigrant women report a
native male partner.20
Among immigrants coming from one of the ﬁve sending countries during
the guest worker period in the 1950s and 1960s - Turkey, former Yugoslavia21,
Greece, Italy, and Spain - men with Turkish roots are especially unlikely to inter-
18Results for all immigrants and those who immigrated after the age of ten are available upon
request.
One could argue that with increasing age, one loses the ability to quickly learn a new language.
Hence, immigrants who come to Germany at an older age face greater diﬃculties learning German
than immigrants arriving at a younger age. Therefore, immigrant children who come at very young
ages, might not be remarkably diﬀerent in their language acquisition from children who are born
in Germany to immigrant parents. Thus, separately considering ﬁrst generation immigrants who
immigrated after the age of ten, accounts for possible diﬀerences in language proﬁciency between
immigrants born in the host country or who came at early ages on the one hand, and those who
immigrated later in life on the other hand. Moreover, ten is the earliest age at which children ﬁnish
primary school and are sorted into secondary education. Thus, using ten as a cut oﬀ point makes
the sample more homogeneous in terms of primary education and language acquisition. However,
the results do not change essentially with this modiﬁcation and statistical signiﬁcance changes
most probable due to diﬀerent sample sizes.
19Sample attrition is assumed to be random and unrelated to marriage. It thus presumably does
not bias the results.
20Immigrants who report a partner whose immigrant status is not deﬁned are dropped from the
sample. Furthermore, those who switch between native and immigrant partners are also excluded
from the analysis due to ambiguous results. This restriction seems harmless since only few people
switch between native and immigrant partners, and the number of cases where partner’s ethnic
origin is not deﬁnable is also negligible.
21includes immigrants from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and
Kosovo-Albania
17marrywhileItalianmenareparticularlyofteninpartnershipswithnatives, Table1.
Hence, with respect to intermarriage, Italian men seem to be more integrated than
others. The inﬂux of Polish and Russian immigrants - partly including Aussiedler
- developed more recently and those ethnic groups are less well established in the
German society. However, women from Poland are especially often intermarried,
while women with Turkish origin very seldom live with German men, Table 2.22
Table 1: Marriage Patterns of 1st Gen. Immigrant Men
Single Eventually Married with Total
Immigrant Native
¯ Mig ¯ Nat
Immigrant Men 725 2,309 488 3,522
20.58% 65.56% 13.86%
By Selected Ethnic Origin
Turkey 168 689 39 896
18.75% 76.90% 4.35% [25.44%]
Ex-Yugoslavia 88 324 43 455
19.34% 71.21% 9.45% [12.92%]
Greece 52 211 17 280
18.57% 75.36% 6.07% [7.95%]
Italy 84 284 78 446
18.83% 63.68% 17.49% [12.66%]
Spain 58 146 29 233
24.89% 62.66% 12.45% [6.62%]
Poland 54 154 34 242
22.31% 63.64% 14.05% [6.87%]
Russia 39 125 5 169
23.08% 73.96% 2.96% [4.80%]
Other 182 376 243 801
22.72% 46.94% 30.34% [22.74%]
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel from 1984-2007
First generation immigrants aged 20 to 65, unweighted sample.
Percentage share on total immigrant population in [ ].
Regarding selected characteristics presented in Tables 3 and 4, intermarrying
immigrants - both men and women - have on average more years of schooling,
spent more years in Germany and had more full-time labor market experience
than other immigrants. Self-reported language skills of those who eventually live
with natives are signiﬁcantly better than of those who marry other immigrants.
22As seen in the tables, small sample sizes do not allow for separate regressions diﬀerentiated
by ethnic group.
18Table 2: Marriage Patterns of 1st Gen. Immigrant Women
Single Eventually Married with Total
Immigrant Native
¯ Mig ¯ Nat
Immigrant Women 583 2,279 479 3,341
17.45% 68.21% 14.34%
By Selected Ethnic Origin
Turkey 124 667 7 798
15.54% 83.58% 0.88% [23.89%]
Ex-Yugoslavia 93 321 33 447
20.81% 71.81% 7.38% [13.38%]
Greece 31 210 5 246
12.60% 85.37% 2.03% [7.36%]
Italy 42 246 24 312
13.46% 78.85% 7.69% [9.34%]
Spain 29 147 8 184
15.76% 79.89% 4.35% [5.51%]
Poland 64 166 57 287
22.30% 57.84% 19.86% [8.58%]
Russia 25 122 22 169
14.79% 72.19% 13.02% [5.06%]
Other 175 400 323 898
19.49% 44.54% 35.97% [26.88%]
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel from 1984-2007
First generation immigrants aged 20 to 65, unweighted sample.
Percentage share on total immigrant population in [ ].
Thereby, language proﬁciency is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1
referringto“verypoor”languageskillsand5to“verygood”abilities.23 Generally,
writing skills are poorer compared to oral qualiﬁcation regardless of marriage type
but it is better for intermarrying immigrants.
The share of unemployed, including persons enrolled in school, is especially
high among women who marry within the immigrant community. Intermarried
immigrant women, on the other hand, have the lowest unemployment. The share
of unemployed intermarried immigrant men does not diﬀer much from that of
men in intra-immigrant marriage, although it is particularly smaller than that of
singles. Average earnings are highest for intermarried immigrants. However, sin-
23Information on language evaluation is not available for all years. It is reported only in 1997,
1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. The variable is linearly interpolated for the missing years between
1997 and 2005 and extrapolated for the remaining years. To ease interpretation, the scale is re-
versed. In the survey 1 denoted “very good” language abilities and 5 “very poor” skills.
19gle immigrant women earn more than women in intra-immigrant marriage, while
single immigrant men earn far less than men in intra-immigrant marriage.
Table 3: Selected Characteristics for 1st Gen. Immigrant Men
Single Eventually Married with
Immigrant Native
¯ Mig ¯ Nat
Years of Schooling 10.13 (2.16) 9.97 (2.11) 11.45 (2.84)
Speaking Abilities(1) 3.95 (0.96) 3.51 (0.89) 4.38 (0.71)
Writing Abilities(1) 3.40 (1.36) 2.79 (1.17) 3.74 (1.09)
Years since immigration 17.15 (8.24) 19.29 (8.78) 23.54 (11.15)
Share unemployed or enrolled in school 38.67% 21.89% 20.89%
Full-time Experience 9.87 (9.98) 16.00 (8.96) 16.95 (11.53)
Earnings(2) 1,766 (894) 2,254 (1,043) 2,680 (1,927)
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel from 1984-2007
First generation immigrants aged 20 to 65.
Unweighted averages of pooled sample; Standard deviation in parenthesis.
(1): Measured on a scale from 1 (“none at all”) to 5 (“very good”)
(2): Inﬂation-adjusted monthly labor gross earnings
Table 4: Selected Characteristics for 1st Gen. Immigrant Women
Single Eventually Married with
Immigrant Native
¯ Mig ¯ Nat
Years of Schooling 10.43 (2.77) 9.43 (2.18) 11.98 (2.82)
Speaking Abilities1 3.96 (1.04) 3.30 (1.06) 4.46 (0.72)
Writing Abilities1 3.47 (1.40) 2.59 (1.30) 4.04 (1.10)
Years since immigration 18.27 (9.09) 17.64 (8.85) 21.75 (12.22)
Share unemployed or enrolled in school 43.62% 53.36% 41.52%
Full-time Experience 10.05 (10.50) 7.66 (8.19) 9.72 (9.54)
Earnings2 1,488 (902) 1,330 (787) 1,521 (1,182)
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel from 1984-2007
First generation immigrants aged 20 to 65.
Unweighted averages of pooled sample; Standard deviation in parenthesis.
(1): Measured on a scale from 1 (“none at all”) to 5 (“very good”)
(2): Inﬂation-adjusted monthly labor gross earnings
6 Empirical Results
The study focuses on ﬁrst generation male immigrants assuming that (a) men
generally beneﬁt from marriage in terms of earnings, (b) eﬀects steming from a
20native partner are more valuable for the non-native partner, and (c) considering
only males avoids selection issues related to female employment. Nevertheless,
regressions are run also for immigrant women, even though results need to be
treated carefully.24
The dependent variable is the logarithm of inﬂation-adjusted monthly labor
gross earnings.25 Apart from successively added marital variables, the baseline
speciﬁcation includes experience and its square term only. Further explanatory
variables such as dummy variable indicating the highest schooling degree, self-
reported language abilities26, tenure and its square, ﬁrm size, actual hours worked,
and dummy variables accounting for full-time employment status, region, and
industry are included in the regressions presented in the last columns of the tables.
For ﬁrst generation male immigrants, the eﬀect of marriage - regardless of
partner descent - amounts to a 12 percent change in earnings according to the
OLS results given in the ﬁrst column of Table 5. Distinguishing the inﬂuence of
marriage by migration background of the partner leads to a large increase for those
with native partners and a severe decrease for intra-immigrant marriage, Column
2. The eﬀects are not only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero but also from each
other. Thus, while ignoring self-selection, intermarriage seems highly beneﬁcial
24Due to a lack of persuasive exclusion restrictions, a selection correction such as suggested
by Heckman would rely on the non-linearity of the model only. Because of this caveat no such a
correction is made. But, since individual characteristics presumably determine selection into labor
force participation, the ﬁxed eﬀects model, at least partly, accounts for possible selection biases.
Results for the whole male and female immigrant population as well as for those who immigrated
after the age of ten are available upon request. However, except for slight diﬀerences in signiﬁ-
cance levels, the main results do not change with the modiﬁcation of the samples.
25Earnings are adjusted by multiplication with the consumer price index. They are expressed
in year 2000 earnings. This adjustment makes the use of year dummies redundant and thereby
decreases the number of explanatory variables. Results do not change in principle if unadjusted
earnings in combination with year dummies are used.
26This information is only available for foreigners but not for German nationals.
21Table 5: Earnings Regressions - 1st Gen.Immigrant Men
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Earnings OLS - 1 OLS - 2 FE - 1 FE - 2 FE - 3 FE - 4 FE - 5
Married 0.116∗∗∗
(0.02)
Nat 0.217∗∗∗ 0.071 0.067 0.077 0.065 0.051
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Nat × ExpDif f -0.001 -0.008 -0.012 -0.014
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Nat × ExpDif f2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp 0.008 0.018 0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
¯ Nat × Exp2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Mig 0.096∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mig × ExpDif f -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.006
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mig × ExpDif f2 -0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Mig × Exp -0.005 -0.008 -0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
¯ Mig × Exp2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Exp 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.028∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Exp2 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Add.Expl.(1) No No No No No No Yes
Constant 7.343∗∗∗ 7.336∗∗∗ 7.277∗∗∗ 7.245∗∗∗ 7.269∗∗∗ 7.277∗∗∗ 6.214∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
N 19865 19865 19865 19865 19865 19865 15919
Source: German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel 1984 - 2007, unweighted sample
immigrants aged 20-65; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1): Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy,
ﬁrm size, region and industry dummies, imputation ﬂag.
22Table 6: Earnings Regressions - 1st Gen.Immigrant Women
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Earnings OLS - 1 OLS - 2 FE - 1 FE - 2 FE - 3 FE - 4 FE - 5
Married -0.225∗∗∗
(0.03)
Nat -0.211∗∗∗ -0.106∗ -0.108∗ -0.109∗ -0.103 -0.046
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Nat × ExpDif f -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Nat × ExpDif f2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp -0.004 -0.016 0.006
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
¯ Nat × Exp2 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Mig -0.228∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.018
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Mig × ExpDif f -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Mig × ExpDif f2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Mig × Exp -0.004 -0.016 0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
¯ Mig × Exp2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Exp 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Exp2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Add.Expl.(1) No No No No No No Yes
Constant 6.766∗∗∗ 6.766∗∗∗ 6.815∗∗∗ 6.779∗∗∗ 6.788∗∗∗ 6.804∗∗∗ 5.320∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.31)
N 12248 12248 12248 12248 12248 12248 9126
Source: German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel 1984 - 2007, unweighted sample
immigrants aged 20-65; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1): Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy,
ﬁrm size, region and industry dummies, imputation ﬂag, dummy for children living in the household.
23over marriage with another immigrant.
However, once personal heterogeneity is accounted for results change notice-
ably, Column 3.27 The eﬀect of intermarriage is reduced drastically in magnitude
and loses signiﬁcance compared to single immigrants. This implies that the eﬀect
of intermarriage is overestimated in the OLS model and the coeﬃcient is upward
biased if unobserved factors are ignored.28
Even though there seems to be no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect from intermar-
riage compared to singles, the diﬀerence between eﬀects from intermarriage and
intra-immigrant marriage is also not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding remains
unchanged when further marital variables are added to account for development
during marriage and general advantages of either marriage type. Thus, intermar-
riage does not appear to be beneﬁcial to intra-immigrant marriage once selection
is taken into account.
Although there seems to be no immediate advantage from one type of mar-
riage over the other, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the returns to experience
for those who eventually intermarry and those who eventually marry an immi-
grant partner. Those who will live with a native some time during their observa-
tion, receive greater returns to experience than those who only live with immi-
grant partners. This diﬀerence becomes signiﬁcant when the model accounts for
non-linearity in the returns to experience, Column 6. Adding further explanatory
27According to the Hausman-Taylor Test the Null-hypothesis of zero correlation between the
explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity is rejected. Thus, a random eﬀects model
would lead to inconsistent estimates whereas the ﬁxed eﬀects model is consistent - even though it
might not be fully eﬃcient.
28Insigniﬁcance of intermarriage compared to singles could also stem from little variance in
the indicator variable. Identiﬁcation comes from those who switch between being single and
intermarriage. Thisidentiﬁcationisrelativelylimitedsinceonly53immigrantmenswitchbetween
being single and reporting native partners.
24variables does not aﬀect these main results, Column 7.
As opposed to men, no marriage premium is found for women, Table 6. Con-
trarily, women seem to receive a ‘penalty’ from marriage in comparison to singles.
However, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the eﬀect of intermarriage and
intra-immigrant marriage in any speciﬁcation. The magnitude of the marriage co-
eﬃcients is halved when individual ﬁxed eﬀects are taken into account, indicating
that negative inﬂuences are overestimated in the OLS model. The coeﬃcients
decrease even further and ﬁnally lose signiﬁcance when additional explanatory
variables are included. These variables control for observable personal and job
related characteristics and seem to explain most of the negative eﬀects.
Native men generally beneﬁt from marriage even after controlling for unob-
servable factors. However, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between intermar-
riageandmarriagewithnatives, neitherinOLSnorinFEspeciﬁcation. Incontrast
to immigrant men, experience gained during marriage with natives contributes
positively for native men, although there seems to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect from
experience gained during intermarriage. No diﬀerences in returns to experience
are found between those who ever intermarry and those who do not. This is con-
sistent with the assumption that diﬀerences in returns to experience signal greater
commitment which is only convincing for immigrants.
Similar to immigrant women, native women do not seem to beneﬁt from mar-
riage. However, for native women intermarriage seems to be less harmful than
marriage to other natives - both with and without controlling for individual ﬁxed
eﬀects. In particular, apparent disadvantages from intermarriage disappear once
unobserved factors are taken into account and especially when controlling for ad-
ditional observable characteristics.
25Table 7: Earnings Regressions - Native Men
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Earnings OLS - 1 OLS - 2 FE - 1 FE - 2 FE - 3 FE - 4 FE - 5
Married 0.170∗∗∗
(0.01)
Mig 0.209∗∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.120∗ 0.116∗ 0.123∗ 0.099
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Mig × ExpDif f 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.007
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mig × ExpDif f2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Mig × Exp -0.006 -0.012 -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
¯ Mig × Exp2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Nat 0.168∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Nat × ExpDif f 0.002 0.003∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nat × ExpDif f2 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Exp 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Add.Expl.(1) No No No No No No Yes
Constant 7.236∗∗∗ 7.236∗∗∗ 7.180∗∗∗ 7.201∗∗∗ 7.212∗∗∗ 7.212∗∗∗ 5.654∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21)
N 84189 84189 84189 84189 84189 84189 76022
Source: German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel 1984 - 2007, unweighted sample
immigrants aged 20-65; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1): Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy,
ﬁrm size, region and industry dummies, imputation ﬂag.
26One possible explanation for diﬀerent eﬀects on immigrants and natives as
well as for men and women may be diﬀerent resource allocation within intermar-
riage: Native partners may be less likely to be discriminated against in the native
labor market and thus more likely to have positive earnings. Their earnings might
even exceed that of the immigrant partner because of their comparable advantage.
Therefore immigrants who live with natives might work less, take on lower paying
jobs or work in occupations that do not match their qualiﬁcation perfectly to pro-
mote partner’s labor market success. In this case, the immigrant partner appears
to be experiencing a ‘penalty’ from living with a native while the native partner
receives a ‘bonus’ from intermarriage.29
In contrast, immigrants in intra-immigrant relationships as well as native men
might follow more ‘traditional’ gender roles where the husband works and the
wife takes care of the household. The husband may than beneﬁt from this house-
hold specialization. In addition, as pointed out by Baker and Benjamin (1997),
intra-immigrant couples may have speciﬁc role allocations which favor men’s
abilities exceptionally. Accordingly, immigrant wives tend to accept any oﬀered
occupation upon arrival in order to support their husbands’ human capital accu-
mulation. Later, wives retire from the labor market and specialize in household
production.30 This gives rise to the presumption that gender roles in intermarriage
may diﬀer from other marital constellations. However, by now this assumption is
pure speculation and needs thoroughly veriﬁcation.
29This argument is related to those given to explain working spouse penalties, discussed, for
instance, by Jacobsen and Rayack (1996); Hotchkiss and Moore (1999); and Song (2007).
30Furthermore, intermarried immigrants might not have immigrated for economic reasons. That
is, those who immigrated on grounds of marriage with nationals might be less prepared and face
more diﬃculties ﬁnding a well paying job than immigrants who based their decision to immigrate
on expected economic success.
27Table 8: Earnings Regressions - Native Women
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Earnings OLS - 1 OLS - 2 FE - 1 FE - 2 FE - 3 FE - 4 FE - 5
Married -0.213∗∗∗
(0.01)
Mig -0.078∗ 0.018 0.025 0.062 0.070 0.134∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Mig × ExpDif f -0.003 -0.017∗ -0.019 -0.019∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mig × ExpDif f2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Mig × Exp 0.013 -0.003 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
¯ Mig × Exp2 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Nat -0.221∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Nat × ExpDif f -0.000 0.002 0.008∗ 0.005∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nat × ExpDif f2 -0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp -0.004 -0.012∗ 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
¯ Nat × Exp2 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Exp 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Add.Expl.(1) No No No No No No Yes
Constant 6.836∗∗∗ 6.835∗∗∗ 6.835∗∗∗ 6.833∗∗∗ 6.840∗∗∗ 6.843∗∗∗ 5.140∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.27)
N 66082 66082 66082 66082 66082 66082 58208
Source: German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel 1984 - 2007, unweighted sample
immigrants aged 20-65; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1): Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy,
ﬁrm size, region and industry dummies, imputation ﬂag, dummy for children living in the household.
287 Conclusion
Apart from educational and economic similarity, intermarriage is generally con-
sidered a measure of social integration. Additionally, intermarriage is suspected
of aﬀecting the economic performance of immigrants as native spouses may foster
linguistic adjustment, provide access to certain networks, and help adaptation to
the host country’s society. However, enhanced productivity of intermarried immi-
grants might not stem from the native partner directly, but might be attributed to
other productivity characteristics that simultaneously drive economic success and
partner choice. Thus, accounting for endogeneity is crucial in the context of inter-
marriage and economic integration. To do so, a ﬁxed eﬀects framework is chosen
to measure the eﬀect of intermarriage on earnings. The advantageous structure
of the data allows accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and to incorporate
diﬀerent times at which intermarriage might inﬂuence individual earnings.
The econometric model considers short and long term eﬀects of intermarriage
in contrast to singles and those in an intra-immigrant marriage, and tests the as-
sumption that marital choice signals diﬀerent human capital accumulation. Ac-
cordingly, immigrants who marry natives may obtain greater returns to labor mar-
ket experience because they better adapt to foreign customs and norms. In that
case, the decision to intermarry signals greater commitment and generally better
labor market integration of intermarrying immigrants.
Empirical ﬁndings for immigrant men indicate that immediate eﬀects from in-
termarriage are present and exceed that of intra-immigrant marriage in the simple
OLS model. However, the corresponding coeﬃcients decrease and lose signif-
icance once unobserved abilities are accounted for. There seems to be no sig-
29niﬁcant diﬀerence between intermarriage and marriage among immigrants after
selection issues are taken into account. However, those who intermarry receive
greater returns to experience than those who exclusively live with other immi-
grants. This indicates better general labor market integration of those intermar-
rying. Findings imply that selection into intermarriage based on individual time-
invariant characteristics is crucial and ﬁnding a native partner works as a signal
for an advantageous economic status.
Immigrant women seem not to beneﬁt from either type of marriage. However,
negative eﬀects are mitigated when accounting for unobservable factors and in-
cluding additional explanatory variables. Native women in particular beneﬁt from
marriage with immigrant men. Though, there are no eﬀects from intermarriage
for native men.
Finding diﬀerent eﬀects for immigrants and natives as well as for men and
women possibly indicates diﬀerent human capital allocations within each type of
partnership. Furtherresearchshouldconcentrateonpossiblydiﬀerentgenderroles
within intermarriage and explanations oﬀered in this study need to be veriﬁed.
Moreover, other economic productivity measures should be considered. As
intermarriage might aﬀect wages indirectly via access to better jobs and enhanced
laborforceparticipation, researchontheeﬀectofintermarriageonself-employment
and employment rates or types of occupations as done by Georgarakos and Tatsir-
amos (2009), Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009a) and (2009b) for immigrants in
the United States is also desirable for immigrants living in Germany. Furthermore,
possible economic eﬀects of intermarriage for immigrants women should be con-
sidered in greater depth. In this regard, special diﬃculties related to selection into
labor force participation need to be taken into account.
30Thus, various aspects of whether and how intermarriage is related to economic
success are not yet explored exhaustively leaving highly interesting questions still
unanswered and encouraging further research on this very fascinating topic.
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